SEC.01
The playbook
The run starts read-only: the recon probes decide what happens next. The steps that follow are adapted to the distribution and state found — a real machine is rarely clean.
- 01reconthe distribution: apt (Debian/Ubuntu) or dnf (RHEL/Fedora/Rocky/Alma)
- 02reconnftables present?
- 03reconfirewalld or UFW active → STOP (do not stack two firewalls)
- 04reconexisting tables (docker, f2b, crowdsec, servor_filter) — the recipe leaves them alone
- 05reconthe effective SSH port(s) (sshd_config or ssh.socket on Ubuntu ≥ 22.10) — this port must stay open
- 06reconTCP/UDP ports listening publicly (WireGuard, games… to add or flag)
- 07reconnumber of established SSH sessions to preserve (adjust the port)
- 08reconfile loaded at boot: /etc/nftables.conf (Debian/Ubuntu) or /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf (RHEL)
- 09actInstall nftablesverify
- 10actWrite and validate the Servor rulesetverify
- 11actArm the safety net (auto-removal in 10 min)verify
- 12actApply the rulesetdestructiveverify
- 13actLoad at bootverify
- 14actDisarm the safety net (after checking SSH access)verify
SEC.02
What it verifies
Each step ships its own check. The run only moves on when the check passes, so what the recipe reports as done is what is actually on the server.
- 01verifyInstall nftablesVerified by
nft --version - 02verifyWrite and validate the Servor rulesetVerified by
nft -c -f /etc/servor/nftables-servor.nft && echo ok - 03verifyArm the safety net (auto-removal in 10 min)Verified by
systemctl is-active servor-fw-guard.timer - 04verifyApply the rulesetVerified by
nft list chain inet servor_filter input | grep 'tcp dport' - 05verifyLoad at bootVerified by
nft -c -f /etc/nftables.conf && systemctl is-enabled nftables - 06verifyDisarm the safety net (after checking SSH access)Verified by
systemctl is-active servor-fw-guard.timer
SEC.03
Guardrails
Non-negotiable instructions the run must respect, whatever it finds on the server.
The effective SSH port MUST be in the ruleset, and established,related accepted (agent outbound tunnel). STOP if firewalld or UFW is active. Never nft flush ruleset nor systemctl restart nftables: only touch the servor_filter table. Always nft -c before applying, safety net armed before apply, disarmed only after verification.
SEC.04
Variables
What you choose before launching — the recipe fills in the rest.
| Name | Meaning |
|---|---|
| ${ports} | Public TCP ports to open (besides SSH) |
SEC.05
How a recipe runs in Servor
Servor is zero-knowledge: the platform cannot execute anything on its own. When you launch this recipe, a run reads the reconnaissance, plans the steps and asks for your approval. Each approved command is signed by your browser — with a key the server never sees — then relayed verbatim to the agent, which verifies the signature locally before executing.
search by intent — type “firewall”, get ufw
- 01Read-only reconnaissance before any change
- 02Every command signed by your browser, approved by you
- 03Each step verified before the run moves on, every run kept in the history
SEC.06
Deploy on Servor button
Maintain nftables firewall or a project that needs it? Put this button in your README or on your site: one click and your users install it on their own server.
SEC.07
More security recipes
- 01Harden SSHTurns off password login and root password login, keeps keys. Destructive: verify your key access first.
- 02fail2banfail2ban with the SSH jail on the right port, active and verified.
- 03UFW firewallUFW: denies incoming by default, allows the real SSH port + chosen ports, with a safety net. Destructive: keeps SSH open.
- 04Automatic security updatesEnables automatic security updates: unattended-upgrades (Debian/Ubuntu) or dnf-automatic (RHEL/Fedora).
- 05CrowdSecCrowdSec collaborative IPS, SSH collections and firewall bouncer.
Verified recipe
Run this recipe on your server
Connect a server, launch the recipe, and approve each step as Servor executes and verifies it. Free plan, no card required.